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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LAWRENCE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION

-andLAWRENCE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT

The stipulated issues are:
1. Is the grievance
arbitrable?

of

HAZEL

LYNN

MALKES

2. If so, did the District violate Article XIX
2 of the collective bargaining agreement
when effective July 1, 2001 it terminated
health insurance benefits of Ms. Malkes?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A
District

hearing

on

was

September

held
13,

at

2001

the
at

offices
which

of

time

the
Ms.

School
Malkes,

hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named

Association and School District

concerned were afforded full opportunity
argument

and

to

examine

and

appeared.

All

to offer evidence and

cross-examine

witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived and the parties filed post-hearing
briefs.

Arbitrability
The District contends that the grievance is not
arbitrable because the District did not receive proper notice of
the Demand for arbitration in accordance with Rule 7 of the Labor
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
That Rule reads:
"Arbitration under an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement under these
rules may be initiated by either party in the
following manner:
(A)

by giving written notice
party of its initiation
(demand).

to the other
to arbitrate

I accept as credible the testimony of the Association
that its Demand for arbitration was mailed both to the District
and the American Arbitration Association.

The Rules unlike the

CPLR, do not require that service of the arbitration Demand be by
Certified or Registered mail or by personal service.
ordinary mail is adequate.

Rather

And this case, per the collective

bargaining agreement is under the Rules.
Moreover,
Demand

from

the

even if the District did not receive the
Association,

it

soon

thereafter

received

correspondence from the Arbitration Association acknowledging the
Association's

Demand with

a

list

of arbitrators sent to the

District and the Association for the selection of the arbitrator.
I take arbitral notice of that communication from this
Arbitration Association, notifying the District of the filing of

this grievance for arbitration.

So, I see no prejudice to the

District or to its case herein by a failure of delivery of an
original Demand for arbitration, if such failure occurred.

The

District received timely and adequate notice of the filing for
arbitration, which avoided any prejudice to its case.
Accordingly, the grievance is arbitrable.

The Merits
Pertinent

to this case is Article XIX

2 (a) of the

contract, which reads:
The current group health insurance program or
its equivalent will be made available to
employees whose workweek is not less than 20
hours subject to regulations and conditions
established by the insurance carrier.
All
health benefits for this unit are on a
twelve-month basis. (emphasis added)
The grievant was an employee who met the no less than
20 hours work week requirement, and received health

insurance

benefits each year from the date of her hire as a full-time pool
substitute in March 1999 until July 1, 2001.
Prior to the termination of her benefits on July 1,
2001, she received the health insurance benefits on a continuing
twelve-month basis, which included the summer months of July and
August in 1999 and 2000.
It is the Association's contention that the contract
provision, underscored above, requires the continuation of health
benefits for twelve months each school year.

And that that

twelve-month period runs from the commencement of a teacher's
teaching schedule in September, through the next August.
Accordingly, contends the Association, irrespective of
the grievant's status in July and August 2001, her contractual
benefit of health insurance must continue through July and August
2001.
The
provision

District

differently.

interprets
It

asserts

the
that

controlling
the

health

contract
insurance

benefit is for "employees," and therefore, ceases when employment
with the District ends.
Here, the District points out that the grievant was
terminated at the end of June 2001, and that therefore, her
entitlement to benefits ended at that point.

It explains that

she continued to receive benefits during July and August of the
prior years because she remained an "employee" then by virtue of
her

teaching

assignments

beginning

again

in

the

subsequent

Septembers.
Moreover, the District asserts that the "school year"
runs not from September through August but from July 1st through
June

30th.

And

that therefore,

the grievant

months of health insurance benefits

received

twelve

over that period of time,

terminating, with her severance from employment, on July 1, 2001.
Based on the facts peculiar to this case, I find I
need not define the "school year," nor decide whether the
4

grievant's benefits ended on July 1st, 2001; nor whether the
contractual reference to benefits on a twelve-month basis carries
over after an employee's termination.
I need

not decide

those

questions, which

otherwise

would be critical to this case, because I am not satisfied that
the grievant was, in fact, terminated effective July 1, 2001.
The letter of "termination"
judgement

the possibility

is equivocal, leaving open, in my
of her

reappointment

for

September

2001.
The letter purporting to notify the grievant of the
end of her employment with the District is a letter dated June 4,
2001 from the Principal, Mark Kavarsky.
In significant part it read:
... I... informed you that I was withholding my
recommendation for you as a pool sub for
2001-02 so that I may review the staff
organization needs for the Middle School.
(emphasis added)

I do not read that to be a final termination decision.
Though the letter went on to cite a "replacement" position for
which the grievant was not qualified, it did not unconditionally
terminate
language

her
not

employment.
to rule out

Indeed,

I interpret

the possibility

the

foregoing

of an opening

and

reappointment after, as the Principal stated, he "review(ed) the
staff organization's needs for the Middle School."

The dictionary definition of "withholding" is "to hold
back" or "to keep from actions."
pending

a

later

final

It leaves things in suspension,

decision.

It

did

not,

in my

view,

unequivocally notify the grievant that there was no possibility
of reassignment for September 2001.
It

can

be

argued

that

the

final

sentence

of

the

letter:
"I wish you the best in the future and thank
you for all your efforts on behalf of the
children of Lawrence Middle School."
is notice

that

statement

is

contract

her

services had

boilerplate

rights

are

come

cordiality

involved,

is

to

an

end.

and,

in

my

not

enough

But
view,

to

that
where

constitute

absolute notice of termination.
Under that particular circumstance it cannot be said
that for health insurance purposes, the grievant was effectively
terminated until September when she was replaced and/or not reappointed.
So, from July 2001 through August 2001, her status was
contractually similar to that of Stephen Clements.

Mr. Clements,

a teacher was "excessed" in June 1974, "excessed" in June 1975,
and

again

"excessed"

synonymous with

an

in

June

industrial

1985.
"layoff."

To

be

"excessed"

It is notice

is

to an

employee that his active services in the future are not needed,
but he retains a right of "recall" if conditions change.
grievant's status (i.e. "withholding recommendation" on
6

The

re-appointment) is equivalent to Clements' status as "excessed."
Yet, Clements continued to receive his health insurance benefits
for the months of July and August, 1974, 1975 and 1985.
The District justifies this on the fact that Clements
was ultimately re-appointed for the Septembers of those years,
and that therefore, he was not terminated.

Clearly, however, had

he not been re-appointed, and had he remained "excessed" he would
have received the health insurance benefits for July and August
nonetheless.
particular

The

grievant

is

similarly

situated.

Under

the

facts of this case, I need not, therefore, decide

whether the grievant would have been entitled to health insurance
benefits

for July and August

2001 if she had been terminated

unconditionally on July 1st, 2001.

Though perhaps disappointing

to the parties, I leave that to a later dispute.
AWARD
The grievant, HAZEL LYNN MALKES was entitled
to continuation of the health insurance
benefits for the months of July and August
2001.
The District shall make her whole for any
expenses incurred by its wrongful termination
of those benefits on July 1st, 2001.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

November 9, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
7

x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
STIPULATED
AGREEMENT

BUW LOCAL 329
-and-

NATIONAL GRID USA SERVICE COMPANY, INC.
x

The issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its rejection of the
grievant, SEAN MURPHY for the position of
Material Handler at the Franklin CDC in April
2001? If so, what shall be the remedy?
In the course of the proceedings the above-named
parties reached the following Stipulated Agreement:
Without prejudice or precedent for any
further matters, and without prejudice to the
Company's contract rights regarding the
filling of vacancies, SEAN MURPHY shall be
accorded a total of three additional hours of
instruction, practice and testing to qualify
on the forklift trucks. A Union
representative (the shop steward) may
observe.
The Company's determination regarding the
outcome after the three additional hours
shall be final and binding.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument.
Sworn to before me on this
day of October, 2001

£ Pnbl
01MW*"
KTntarv
i>

Notary Public

PATRICIA AA. SIMMONS
PATRICIA
5IMMUNS

Notaiy Public, State of New \Wl
No. 31-4953942
Qualified In New York C
Commission Expires July 31,.

Thomas M. Hession, Company Arbitrator

DATED:

OCTOBER

, 2001

STATE OF

)

COUNTY OF

)

ss:

I, Thomas M. Hession, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Company
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument.
Sworn to before me on this
day of October, 2001

Notary Public
George Fogarty, Union Arbitrator

DATED:

OCTOBER

STATE OF
COUNTY OF

, 2001
)
ss:
)

I, George Fogarty, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Union
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument.
Sworn to before me on this
day of October, 2001

Notary Public

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
STIPULATED
AGREEMENT

BUW LOCAL 329

-andNATIONAL GRID USA SERVICE COMPANY, INC.
The issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its rejection of the
grievant, SEAN MURPHY for the position of
Material Handler at the Franklin CDC in April
2001? If so, what shall be the remedy?
In the course of the proceedings the above-named
parties reached the following Stipulated Agreement:
Without prejudice or precedent for any
further matters, and without prejudice to the
Company's contract rights regarding the
filling of vacancies, SEAN MURPHY shall be
accorded a total of three additional hours of
instruction, practice and testing to qualify
on the forklift trucks. A Union
representative (the shop steward) may
observe.
The Company's determination regarding the
outcome after the three additional hours
shall be final and binding.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument.
Sworn to before me on this
day of October, 2001

•Vr- 4--, „,. -PV.V,I -; ~

Notary Public

PATRICIA A- biivinnwiis*

Notary Public, State of New York
No. 31-4953942
Qualified In New York County,
Commission Expires July 31, _a2£22_2_

Thomas M. Hession, Company Arbitrator

DATED:

OCTOBER

STATE OF

, 2001
)

ss
OUNTY OF

)

I, Thomas M. Hession, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Company
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument.
Sworn to before me on this
day of October, 2001

Notary Public
George Fogarty, Union Arbitrator

DATED:

OCTOBER

STATE OF

, 2001
)

ss:
COUNTY OF
I, George Fogarty, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Union
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument.
Sworn to before me on this
day of October, 2001

Notary Public

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION AND NEW YORK BUS SERVICES

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
RUDOLPH BUTLER? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Undersigned on
February 21, 2001, at which time Mr. Butler, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union
and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

parties filed post-hearing memoranda.
The grievant was discharged on January 12, 2001 "for a
chargeable rear-end accident and previous record."
The outcome of the instant case was cast on July 6, 1999
when the grievant was suspended four days, and warned that future
(accidents)1 "will result in his being terminated."

The four-day

suspension was negotiated by the Union and the Employer, after the

'stationary objects'

Employer's initial decision to discharge the grievant for the
accidents then involved.2
Prior to July 6, 1999, the grievant's driving record
shows some nine chargeable accidents during his eleven years of
employment as a bus driver.

These driving accidents included

hitting parked cars (four times), hitting such objects as a sign
post, a fire hydrant, a tree branch and the side of a bridge.
These prior accidents for which the grievant was
subjected to disciplinary hearings were, in my view, considered by
the Employer in the initial decision to discharge the grievant on
July 6, 1999, following the accident of June 29, 1999, and were
duly considered by both the Union and the Employer in reaching an
agreement to reduce the discharge at that time to the four-day
suspension.
Accordingly, I accept as accurate, and no longer
contestable, the facts of those accidents and the July 6, 1999
agreement between the parties related thereto.

So, the suspension

and final warning are binding and constitute not only a
progressive discipline step, but joint recognition that the
grievant's accident record was excessive and unsatisfactory.
Against that backdrop is the instant charge against the
grievant.

It is undisputed that on January 8, 2001, while driving

a school bus (without passengers) the grievant rear-ended a jeep

striking a "concrete divider and parked car"

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:

The discharge of RUDOLPH BUTLER was for just
cause.

Eric J/i Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

March 23, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Section
collective bargaining agreement
failed to pay certain employees
for July 4th, 2000? If so, what
remedy?

25 of the / / ,
wh-i-eh it
_
holiday pay
shall be the

A hearing was held on December 8, 2000 at which time
representatives

of the above-named Union

and Company

appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The parties

filed post-hearing memoranda.
This decision is limited to the particular facts in this
case and shall not be construed
issue involving holiday pay.

as precedential

for any other

The facts in this case are limited

to a claim for holiday pay for July 4th, 2000 by certain employees
who ended picks on June 28, 2000 and then commenced new picks on
July 5, 2000.

The holiday of July 4th, 2000 fell between the end

of one pick and the beginning of the next pick.

It is the contention of the Union that the foregoing
particular facts fall within the specific provisions of Section 25
of the contract, entitling the grievants to the July 4th, 2000
holiday pay.
In addition to listing July 4th as a paid holiday, the
contract requires that:
"All employees must report to work and
complete their assignment in their last
scheduled day before, first scheduled day
after, and the holiday, if scheduled to be
eligible for any holiday pay whatsoever."
(emphasis added)
The Union argues that the grievants completed their last
scheduled assignment on June 28th, 2000, when their picks ended,
and completed their first scheduled

assignment

with the beginning of their next picks.
work on the July 4th holiday.

on July 5, 2000,

None were scheduled to

The Union asserts that the grievants

complied with the conditions for holiday pay under clear contract
language.
The Company asserts that historically and as a matter of
unvaried

past

practice,

it has

never

granted holiday

pay

to

employees who did not work the holiday, when the holiday fell
between the end of one pick and the beginning of the next pick.
The Company points to other holidays over the years, such as Labor
Day and Union Membership Day for which the Company did not grant
pay when those holidays fell within a hiatus between picks and
that the Union did not object to or grieve those circumstances.

This practice, and the Union's failure to object, should be
interpreted,

the Company

there is no eligibility

argues,

as a mutual

recognition

that

for holiday pay when the holiday falls

between the end of one pick and the beginning of another.
The

Company

points

out

that

to

accept

the

Union's

interpretation of Section 25 would lead to the grant of pay for
holidays that occurred while an employee was on a lengthy layoff,
on the erroneous theory

that the last and first days such an

employee would have worked were the day before his layoff and the
first day following his recall.
I do not consider this last example as relevant to this
case.

First, as I have stated, I am not deciding the eligibility

or non-eligibility of employees on layoff.
grievants

between picks

and

the

holiday

This case involved
of July 4th, 2000.

Secondly, the status of the grievants and on employee on layoff is
different.

The latter (on layoff) are inactive and not considered

regularly employed.

The grievants, I conclude, remain as active

employees during the hiatus of a few days between one pick and the
next.

(As here, between June 28th, 2000, and July 5th, 2000} .

Similarly, the status of employees not working or working
differently during the summer months may be different from the
grievants in this case.

Again, I make no determination regarding

holiday pay during summer months.
As the parties well know, if the contract is clear, past
practice that may be different from that contract language is

prospectively immaterial.

When challenged, the clear contract

language prevails.
For the instant case, and limited to the facts of this
case, namely

a

pick

"hiatus"

of a

few

days, the

holiday of

July 4th, 2000 within that hiatus and grievants who worked a last
assignment at the end of one pick, and the first assignment of the
next pick, I find the contract language clear and supportive of
the Union's position.

Particularly significant to my mind is that

the parties did contemplate "Exceptions" to the "last and first
day" assignment condition, in the event of "substantiated just
cause, i.e. verified sickness, death."

And, though those are

exceptions to the last and first day work requirement, the parties
were aware of "exceptions" generally and had the contemplated
opportunity to include contractual exceptions to eligibility.

The

most obvious would have been to exclude holiday pay for a holiday
that fell within a hiatus between picks.

But that was not done.

Frankly, where the negotiated contract accords employees
specified paid holiday, including July 4th, and where the contract
language does not exclude that pay when the holiday falls within a
hiatus between picks, I think it unreasonable and contrary to the
explicit contractual holiday pay benefit, to deny holiday pay for
July 4th, 2000 when only a few days elapsed between picks during
which July 4th, 2000 fell, when the employees worked the last
scheduled assignment of the prior pick and the first scheduled
assignment of the successor pick.

The "luck of the draw" or,

here, the "luck of the pick" and the calendar for July 4th, 2000,
should

not

work to deny holiday pay

for what otherwise is an

unrestricted contract benefit.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The Company violated Section 25
collective bargaining agreement
failed to pay certain employees
for July 4th, 2000. The Company
to make that payment.

of the
when it
holiday pay
is directed

Eric/f. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

January 17, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

If Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION AND NEW YORK BUS SERVICES
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and-

NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
CLIFORD GUERRIER? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on February 6, 2002, at which time
Mr. Guerrier, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Considering the seriousness of the accident, which the
grievant acknowledges was his fault and due to his negligence
(apparently he activated the bus accelerator rather than the brake
as he moved forward, causing a severe rear-end collision with a
bus that was parked and loading passengers ahead); the injury to
four passengers and its driver and the grievant, requiring
hospital attention for all six; the relative short-term employment

of the grievant with the Company (16 months); the probable
ompensation and tort liability of the Company arising from the
accident; and the cost of repairs to both buses, totally about
$10,000, the grievant's discharge is not surprising.
The "just cause" question, however, is how the facts and
circumstances of this case fit, if at all, into my many prior
decisions on penalties for accidents.
As I hope the parties know, I have not been tolerant of
accidents.

I have enumerated certain principles in that regard.

I have held that the Company has a fiduciary duty to provide safe
transportation for the public, and that its bus drivers have a
high duty of care in the furtherance of that objective.
I have held that a series of accidents, even if minor,
is cause for progression discipline and discharge in my
recognition of "accident proneness."

And that the Company, faced

with an accident-prone driver or one with more than an ordinary
number of minor accidents, need not wait a major accident before
it may terminate such a driver.
In short, I have repeatedly ruled in favor of
preventative action, all in recognition of the Company's and the
drivers' duties to the riding public.

But, I have not held that a driver is an absolute
guarantor of no accidents (except, of course, in the case of
willful misconduct) or that a first accident even one that is
severe is automatically or per se grounds for dismissal.

In that

circumstance I believe that the Impartial Chairman should look to
see if mitigating factors are present and if so whether a
disciplinary penalty less than dismissal is adequate for any such
first offense.
I am not saying that a first but severe accident may not
be grounds for discharge, but rather that if there are mitigating
factors a rule of absolute liability should not necessarily
obtain.
Here, I find factors in mitigation, which support a
ruling that a lengthy disciplinary suspension rather than summary
dismissal, is adequate and proper.
The grievant displayed honesty and contrition.
not try to deny his fault.
his negligence.

He did

He offered no excuses but admitted,

He did not try to justify or explain away what he

did or his mistakes in operating the bus.

He is not charged with

any misconduct.

There is no evidence nor even an allegation of

drug or alcohol use.

He has had no prior disciplines nor

hargeable accidents, and, though self-serving, I believe that his
earlier service with Varsity Bus Lines was accident free.
He expressed what I accept as an honest apology for what
happened, for the injuries he caused and the damage to the
Company's property.

I sensed that except for this accident the

Company considered him a cooperative and satisfactory employee who
took on extra assignments

(on holidays, etc.) and with a likeable

personality.
His plea for another chance was, in my view, sincere and
meaningfully remorseful.
Under the foregoing mitigating circumstances, and
confined to this case alone, I think the grievant can serve
without further trouble.

I have decided to take the chance of

restoring him to duty without any back pay, with the admonition to
him that he must now drive free of accidents.

At the Company's

discretion he may be required to undergo re-training before being
restored to regular duty.

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:

On a last chance basis, the discharge of
CLIFORD GUERRIER is reduced to a disciplinary
suspension. He shall be restored to duty
without back pay. At the Company's option he
shall be required to undergo re-training
before returning to duty.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
CHARLES BEMBRY
Case# 13E30001080QO

-andNEW YORK METRO AREA POSTAL
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION

-X

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
claims of CHARLES BEMBRY?
A hearing was held on February 23, 2001 at which time
Mr.

Bembry,

representatives
appeared.

hereinafter
of

referred

"Bembry"

and

to

the

as

"Bembry,"

above-named

Credit

and
Union

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The parties filed post-hearing memoranda.
Bembry claims that because he was discharged from the
post of Assistant Manager/CFO of the Credit Union, "for reason
other than 'cause'" he is entitled to severance pay under Section
18 of his employment contract for the "remainder of the contract"
(a

period

greater

than

"eighteen

pension contributions,"

M401K

and

insurance,"

"medical

$217,739.99.

health

months"),

plus

"retirement

contributions," "life insurance,"
in

the

total

amount

of

Based on the record before me

I make the following

Findings of Fact:

1. The position of Assistant Manager/CFO, held
by Bembry was an officership of the Credit
Union;
2. Bembry's appointment to that post effective
June 1, 2000 was procedurally violative of
the Credit Union's by-laws and the Federal
Credit Union Act in that it was effectuated
prior to the annual meeting of the Credit
Union membership; and
3. The appointment prior to the annual
membership meeting was not authorized or
justified by instructions or orders from
the Federal Examiner of the National Credit
Union Administration ("NCUA") that would
constitute an exception to the by-laws and
NCUA regulations.
I find that the Assistant Manager/CFO was an officer
within Article VIII of the Credit Union's by-laws.
Article VIII states, inter alia that the "officers of
this Credit Union shall be a president, a vice-president, a
treasurer, and a clerk..." (emphasis added) .
Though the Assistant Manager/CFO is not listed in
Article VIII, it is clear to me that his duties may include the
duties of the treasurer and that he shall assume those duties
"during the absence of the treasurer."

I conclude that with the

partial title CFO (i.e., "Chief Financial Officer") (emphasis

added), Bembry's job was synonymous with that of the "assistant
treasurer" under Section 6 of Article VIII of the by-laws.

In

pertinent part that Section provides that the assistant treasurer
may:
"perform any of the duties devolving on the
treasurer (and)...may also act as the treasurer
during the absence of the treasurer..."

Bembry's contract of employment also supports his
officership.

It provides, inter alia that he "will report

directly to the Chief Executive Officer of the Credit Union" and
"in the absence of the Chief Executive Officer of the Credit
Union, Mr. Charles Bembry will perform the functions of the Chief
Executive Officer's position" (emphasis added).
Clearly the Chief Executive Officer is an officer of
the Credit Union.

So, a person authorized to perform Chief

Executive Officer's functions

(here Bembry) is a fortiori, an

officer also.
Also, Article VIII Section 5 of the by-laws states
inter alia that the treasurer shall be the General Manager of
this Credit Union.

So, as the titles of treasurer and manager

are synonymous, the manager, per force is an officer, the absence
of that title from the by-laws notwithstanding.

Additionally, as

it appears that the Manager is also synonymous with the Chief

Executive Officer, Bembry's authority by contract to assume the
duties of the Chief Executive Officer, further supports the
conclusion that his position as Assistant Manager/CFO is an
officership of the Credit Union.
Bembry was appointed by action of the then Board of
Directors of the Credit Union and signed a three-year contract
dated May 25, 2000.
about June 1, 2000."

The contract was to be effective "on or
The annual membership meeting of the Credit

Union was held in the afternoon of May 26, 2000.

At the

membership meeting certain new directors of the Credit Union were
elected (reflecting the earlier change in leadership of the Local
Union).

The newly constituted Board of Directors (with new

directors Bermudez, Steinberg and Zachman) met on May 30, 2000
and also elected William Smith (the new president of the Local
Union) to fill an additional Board vacancy created by the
resignation of Seymour Goltz.

Among its actions on May 3rd, was a

4-2 vote to "dissolve" the contracts of the Chief Executive
Officer and Chief Financial Officer.

I find it significant that

leading up to that vote, Board member Caniano stated "it is the
Board of Director's responsibility to vote for officers of the
Credit Union" (emphasis added).

I interpret that to mean the

Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer.
member disputed that statement or characterization.

No Board

It is that termination of Bembry's contract as
Assistant Manager/CFO that gave rise to the instant dispute and
arbitration.
The dispute centers on the following part of Section 18
of that contract.

It reads:

In the event that Mr. Charles Bembry is
terminated due for reasons other than "cause"
he will be paid eighteen (18) months
severance compensation or the remainder of
the contract, whichever is greater..."

Article VIII, Section 2 of the by-laws (entitled
Officers and Their Duties) provides that:
"officers elected at the first meeting of the
Board of Directors following the annual
meeting shall hold office for a term of one
year and until the election and qualification
of their respective successors...."

Not before me and not needed for a decision in this
case is whether Bembry's three-year contract was inconsistent
with the foregoing reference to a one-year term.

Here, Bembry's

employment contract preceded the membership annual meeting, not
by vote of the Board of Directors following the annual
membership.
Impliedly, the National Credit Union Act (12 USC §1758)
and the regulations of the National Credit Union Administration
speak to this issue.

Section 1761 (a) of the Act provides inter alia that:
"At their first meeting after the annual
meeting of the members, the directors shall
elect from their members, the board
officers..."

It is undisputed that the foregoing Standard Form for
Credit Union by-laws was adopted by this Credit Union.
Though the foregoing applies to officers of the Board,
not to officers of the Credit Union, its obvious purpose, in my
view, relates to both.

It recognizes that at an annual

membership meeting new Credit Union Board Members may be selected
and that following the annual membership meeting, a newly
constituted and possibly changed Board of Directors would take
office.

Clearly, the purpose of the Standard Form is to preclude

the election of officers of the Board by a Board (or a part
thereof) that is subject to change or rejection by the
membership.

Or, in short, the newly constituted Board, by action

of the membership at its annual meeting, is the Board that should
elect its officers for the future,
That being so, the same purpose and logic should apply
to the election of officers of the Credit Union.

Those officers

should be chosen by a Board fully and newly constituted and
elected by the membership at the annual meeting, and not by a
Board or a part thereof that may be "lame duck" or potentially
"lame duck."

And as I see it, that is the fair and logical
application of both the by-laws and the NCUA Standard Form, and
best reflective of the current will of the Credit Union
membership in this particular case.
Remaining for determination is whether the action of
the then Board on May 25, 2000, prior to the annual meeting, was
compelled or sustainable, irrespective of the by-laws and NCUA
regulations.

Bembry asserts that it was.

He contends that the NCUA, through its Examiner-inCharge, Heather Murphy, directed the Board to have a Chief
Executive Officer replacement in place when the then incumbent
Chief Executive Officer, Stanley Myers, resigned as of June 1,
2000.

And that to meet this directive, the Board had to name a

replacement for Myers, in advance of the annual membership
meeting.

What Murphy said is critical.

Frankly, I do not find

it so definite or precise to supercede the by-laws and the NCUA
regulations.
The NCUA Examination Report stated:
Management Conduct
For the past year, the board of directors has
experienced many changes and personal issues
stemming from the change in sponsor
management. This has left vacancies in the
board and credit committee. According to
your by-laws, you must have 7 board of
directors. Currently there are 6 and Mr.
Myers submitted his letter of resignation
effective June 1, 2000. It is imperative
that you have a full board of directors

elected at your annual meeting at the end of
May, 2000. You must also develop a
succession plan to be sure the Credit Union
operations continue to run smoothly when Mr.
Myers leaves (emphasis added).

The foregoing, read as an entirety means to me that the
timing of two events are, if not, simultaneous, closely related.
They are the election of Board Members at the annual membership
meeting and the "develop(ment") of a "plan" to replace Myers.

As

it is the directors who elect or appoint a replacement for Myers,
it is more logical and consistent with the reference to the bylaws, that Myers' replacement be named by the Board elected at
the annual meeting, or reconstituted by action of that meeting.
Moreover, the requirement that a "plan" to replace
Myers be "develop(ed") to insure that the Credit Union operations
run smoothly when Myers leaves, does not, in my judgement mandate
that a replacement be named and in place on June 1, 2000.

Had

that been the Examination's purpose and intent the wording easily
could have been and should have been more precise.

Instead of

asking that a "plan be developed" it would and should have
insisted that a replacement for Myers be named, appointed and in
office on June 1, 2000.

Indeed, I think that if the NCUA

intended to issue a report and a directive which was inconsistent
or arguably inconsistent with the Credit Union's by-laws and the
NCUA regulations, the Examination report had to be absolutely

clear and unequivocal about when Myers' replacement had to be on
the job.
So a different interpretation is a better reflection of
what the NCUA wanted.
It should be noted that the NCUA Examination and Report
referred to a replacement for Myers —
Executive Officer.

who was the Chief

If there was an urgency to the Examination it

was for the filling of that job, not the job of Assistant
Manager/CFO.

The latter became involved only because the Board

promoted Darlene Green from Chief Financial Officer to Chief
Executive Officer

(as Myers' replacement) creating the Assistant

Manager/CFO vacancy.

Whether the promotion of Green was timely

or premature is not before me.

But the NCUA Report, even if

interpreted urgently, (which I do not) did not relate to the
Chief Financial Officer vacancy, and hence cannot be used to
justify the Board's action regarding that job before the annual
meeting.

And again, the Examination's admonition that the Credit

Union's operations continue to run smoothly" applied to the Chief
Executive Officer's job held by Myers and not the Chief Financial
Officer's job.

So, I cannot find that the NCUA thought or even

considered whether a short vacancy in the Chief Financial
Officer's job would impede the smooth operations of the Credit
Union.

There is no evidence that the NCUA knew of or

contemplated the promotion of Green to Chief Executive Officer.

So, I cannot find that it's admonition to develop a successor
plan related to both the Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer's job.
For the foregoing reasons, the election and appointment
of Bembry as Assistant Manager/CFO prior to the annual membership
committee was violative of the letter and intent of the Credit
Union by-laws and NCUA regulations.

His contract was, therefore,

void and he has no cause of action for severance pay or damages
thereunder.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The claims of CHARLES BEMBRY are denied.

Eric J./^chmertz,Arbitrafcr

DATED:

April 10, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

If Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
LOCAL 3, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-dO,

AAA13-300-00984-00 (A)

CAMES MEHRTENS)

Union,

and
AAA 13-3OO-OO984-OO (B)
CDIANE MEHRTENS)

-and -

NEW YORK RACING ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Employer.

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz

Appearances:

For the Union:
Norman Rothfeld, Esq.
276 Fifth Avenue
Suite 806
New York, NY 10001
For the Employer:
Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP
90 Merrick Avenue
East Meadow, NY 11554
By: Michael C. Axelrod, Esq. and
Robert Connolly, Esq.
John L. Russo, Esq.
Counsel for NYRA
P.O. Box 90
Jamaica, NY 11417

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
By separate letters, each dated June 16, 2000, James Mehrtens and Diane
Mehrtens were notified by the Employer that they were "suspended without pay or
benefits pending the completion of an on-going investigation by NYRA" about
allegations that they had "filed fraudulent documents and engaged in an act of fraud and
dishonesty.. .in connection with obtaining health benefits for.. .Dena McAleavey under
the health benefits plan provided to [them] by NYRA." James and Diane Mehrtens were
married in May 1995. Dena McAleavey is Diane Mehrtens' daughter and James
Mehrtens' step-daughter.
By separate letters, each dated June 23, 2000, the Mehrtens were notified that their
employment had been terminated for their "participation in the act of fraud and
dishonesty directed against NYRA in connection with obtaining dependent health
benefits under the health benefits plan provided to you by NYRA."
Thereafter, the Union filed a demand for joint arbitration under the parties' 20002003 collective bargaining agreement regarding the "discharges of Diane Mehrtens and
James Mehrtens without just cause." The remedy sought is reinstatement with back pay.
Although the Employer initially objected to a joint arbitration, and tried
unsuccessfully to obtain a judicial stay, combined hearings on the discharges of the
employees were held on December 11, 20001 and January 6 and 30, April 5 and 12, 2001.
Without precedent or prejudice, counsel for the parties stipulated at the first day of
hearing that the disciplinary charges against each employee would be treated as separate
The parties' opening statements were not transcribed.

proceedings, notwithstanding the submission of evidence under a single record. One
discussion and opinion is provided simply to avoid an unnecessary repetition of facts
common to each proceeding, but separate awards have been issued for each employee
pursuant to the parties' stipulation.
Counsel for the parties waived the arbitrator's oath and there were no objections to
the conduct of the hearing. The Union gave its closing statement orally at the hearing on
April 12, 2001. The Employer has filed a written memorandum.
ISSUE
The parties stipulated the following issue during the first day of hearing:
Was the discharge of James Mehrtens and/or Diane Mehrtens
for just cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Union
The just cause issue submitted to the Arbitrator allows and requires an assessment
of only that evidence which the Employer had in its possession at the date it discharged
the employees. Information acquired thereafter is not admissible or competent to prove
whether the discharge of either employee was for just cause.
As the employees have been charged with the crime of insurance fraud, the burden
of proof the Employer must satisfy is very high. It did not meet that burden as to either
employee. Indeed, the Employer's case is frivolous no matter what standard of proof is
2 Designated by the case number followed by the letter "(A)" for James Mehrtens and the letter "(B)" for Diane
Mehrtens.

used. There is no persuasive evidence that either employee individually or in conspiracy
with one another and/or other persons intended to or attempted to defraud the Employer
or its insurance carrier. Although Dena did not testify, no adverse inference can be
drawn against the Mehrtens because of her nonappearance because, among other reasons,
it claims a subpoena was served, if at all, not on Dena, but on a person having much
different physical characteristics. The Employer failed to establish the existence of any
company policy known to the employees pursuant to which they were required to notify
their Employer once they learned that their daughter was not, in fact, enrolled or
attending college. Moreover, Diane Mehrtens was not the health benefits policy holder
and, therefore, she had no obligation to notify the Employer of changes in her daughter's
status.
Employer
There is clear and convincing evidence that each employee committed fraud by
knowingly and intentionally submitting forged and altered documents containing false
information known to them to be false for the purpose of obtaining health care benefits
for the daughter, Dena McAleavey, which she was otherwise ineligible to receive.
Indeed, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the record is that the Mehrtens'
culpability has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The employees both participated
in the forgery and the alteration of those documents and accepted health benefits for their
daughter for at least four months after they admitted they knew Dena was not attending
college. The grievants' claims of innocence are not credible.

An inference adverse to the grievants should be drawn from the daughter's failure
to testify and any testimony by the employees regarding statements allegedly made to
them by the daughter are hearsay which should not be considered. Evidence discovered
by the Employer after the employees were discharged is admissible because it is relevant
to the grounds relied upon by the Employer for the discharge.
As fraud, theft and falsification of company records are universally recognized to
be just cause for discharge, and as the Employer has proven acts which breach the
employees' duty of trust and loyalty, the discharge of each grievant must be sustained
and the grievances must be denied.
FACTS
The New York Racing Association, Inc. is a non-profit racing association
incorporated under §202 of the New York State Racing Pari-Mutual Wagering and
Breeding Law (Racing Law). The Employer owns and operates the three major
thoroughbred racetracks in New York pursuant to a franchise conferred upon it by the
State of New York under which excess revenues are returned to the State for the support
of government (Racing Law §208).
The Union represents, among others, the pari-mutual clerks who work at the
racetracks operated by the Employer. Pari-mutual clerks conduct the wagering that takes
place at the tracks and they have responsibility for the substantial monies they receive
and pay out to patrons during wagering.3

Diane Mehrtens' last assignment prior to discharge did not require her to handle money on a regular basis.

James and Diane Mehrtens were employed as pari-mutual clerks at the date of
their discharge on June 23, 2000 and both had been employed in that capacity for a
number of years.
At the relevant dates, James had a family health insurance plan under a Blue
Cross/Blue Shield HMO offered him by the Employer by virtue of his employment.
NYRA also offers individual and husband/wife health insurance plans to its employees.
NYRA's costs for the family health insurance plan are higher, by approximately $220 per
month, than they are for a husband/wife plan, which would have been the Mehrtens'
option but for Dena's continued coverage.4 Family dental and vision coverages also cost
the Employer more than the husband/wife coverage.
In mid-November 1999, the Employer sent James Mehrtens an inter-office
memorandum re Dena's health benefit status. James is informed in that memorandum
that the Employer's records showed that Dena was born in 1980. He is then informed
that Dena's health insurance coverage would end December 31, 1999 unless she is
unmarried, dependent upon the employee for support, and is attending an accredited
institution of higher education. The employee is then asked to check one of two
paragraphs, one continuing coverage; one ending coverage. On that document, a check
mark appears next to the following pre-printed statement:

4

The husband/wife coverage was obtained by NYRA in negotiations as a result of a grievance filed by the Mehrtens
which resulted in an arbitration award that permitted married couples to maintain separate, individual health
insurance coverage. The collective bargaining agreement was changed such that a husband and wife cannot have
individual plans.
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My child is unmarried, dependent upon me for support and
attending the following institution of higher education on a
full time basis:
In the blank space is printed by hand the word "Briarcliff' (sic). By checking that space
on the form, health benefits of an employee's dependent, which would otherwise be
discontinued after December 31 of the year in which the child attains the age of 19, are
continued. James' signature as it appears on that document dated "11/30/99" was made
by his wife Diane at his request and with his authorization.
Sometime after the inter-office memorandum was submitted, James Mehrtens was
told by James Alexander, NYRA's Human Resources Officer, that the Employer would
need something bearing a college letterhead if Dena's health coverage was to be
continued. In response to that request, two additional documents were faxed to the
Employer in January 2000 by Diane Mehrtens.
One of those documents is a "Student Coverage Questionnaire" which is signed
"James Mehrtens" and dated "1/18/00." The questionnaire is not a NYRA form nor is it
one Briarcliffe uses. On that form appears James' identification (Social Security) number
and responses to inquiries stating that "Dependent" "Dena McAleavey," born "4/4/80" is
the employee's "Daughter" who is "single," employed "part-time," without other health
coverage and is a "full-time" student at "Briarcliff College" (sic) with an expected date of
"course completion of "4/01."
Above the signature line appears the following:
I herby certify that the above is correct to the best of my
knowledge.

Beneath the employee's signature line is a space for a "SCHOOL
CERTIFICATION" with instructions as follows:
NOTE: After completing the above information, forward this
form to the school for their certification of questions 6-10.5
Beneath that appears a signature of the School "registrar" dated "1/18/00," the
same as was the date of James' signature, and a copy of the Briarcliffe seal.
At the top of the student questionnaire form is the following handwritten
instruction: "Change Dena McAleavey Child Status to Student Status." This instruction
was written on the form by Diane Mehrtens. James' signature on this form was again
made by Diane Mehrtens who faxed the completed questionnaire form to James
Alexander from her home.
The second document faxed to the Employer by Diane Mehrtens is a "Spring 2000
Registration Form" for Dena McAleavey dated "12/18/99," which bears a signature of
Dena's "advisor," which is the same in appearance as the registrar's signature on the
student questionnaire form. The registration shows certain course work within "section"
for six credits each in sessions 1 and 2. The courses listed are in or related to the field of
graphic design. The form also shows Dena to be a "returning student" with an entry date
of "S99" and that she was not "planning on graduating at the end of this semester." At
the top of the form is type showing the address and telephone number of Briarcliffe
College and a copy of the College's seal.
Those questions concern the student's status.
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On the basis of these documents the Employer continued Dena's coverage.
On January 13, 2000, Diane Mehrtens faxed to the insurance carrier a document
requesting that Dena's status be changed from child to student. That cover document is
signed "Diane McAleavey." Diane testified that this was her signature, but it was her
maiden name. She testified that she has not signed "Diane McAleavey" since her
marriage to James in 1995. Attached to this cover sheet is a copy of a schedule for Dena
for the Fall 1999 semester at Briarcliffe in a program of "Graphic Design/AAS" and the
Spring 2000 Briarcliffe registration form that was faxed to the Employer on January 18,
2000.
In or around March 2000, John Russo, Counsel for NYRA, received an
anonymous telephone call from within Aqueduct Park during which an unknown male
stated that Dena was not in college. The caller indicated that the Mehrtens had
fraudulently claimed health insurance benefits for Dena.
Russo called NYRA's health benefits office and ascertained that Dena was being
covered. Russo then contacted Northern Intelligence Agency, a private investigation
/

agency, which was retained to conduct an investigation into whether Dena was working
and if she was a student at Briarcliffe College.
The investigation agency made its first report to Russo in April 2000. The
investigator, Michael Quartaro, had ascertained that Dena was then working
approximately 35 hours per week at a hair salon. It was also reported to Russo that
Dena's Spring 2000 College registration form appeared to have been "doctored."
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Quartaro testified that he went to Briarcliffe College after he was contacted by
Russo. Quartaro met with Francine Byrnes, the Briarcliffe Registrar. After Byrnes
checked the College's records, she told Quartaro there

was no record of Dena having

been enrolled or attending Briarcliffe at any date. Quartaro showed Byrnes the student
coverage questionnaire and Dena's Spring 2000 registration form. Byrnes did not
recognize the College official's signature on the questionnaire as being anyone from the
Registrar's office and told him that no one else could sign as Registrar. Byrnes also told
Quartaro that the student questionnaire form is not one issued by the College. Byrnes
also told Quartaro that the spring registration form was not a true college form because
the real form, which Byrnes gave to Quartaro, and which was in use during Spring 2000,
does not contain the College's address or its insignia. Quartaro reported this information
to Russo.
Byrnes sent Quartaro a letter dated April 12, 2000 confirming that there was no
registration on file for "Dena McLeavey" (sic) for the Spring 2000 semester and another
confirmation of that finding for "Dena McAleavey" on November 22, 2000. Both
documents contain the same social security number for Dena.
Quartaro's findings were reported to Russo over the telephone and in writing as
they were discovered. The agency's final report issued June 10, 2000.
James Mehrtens was called as a witness by the Employer. He testified that he
authorized his wife to sign the November 1999 inter-office memorandum attesting to
Dena's attendance at Briarcliffe and the student questionnaire form dated "1/18/00." He
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could not recall where he had obtained the student questionnaire form, but he believed
that Dena had given him the Spring 2000 registration form.
As James testified, Dena told him that she was going to go to Briarcliffe and he
thought she had enrolled. It was not until late January 2000 or early February 2000 that
he learned that she was not in fact enrolled or attending Briarcliffe or any other college.
Although he knew she had to be going to college to be covered under his insurance, he
did not inform NYRA that she was not a student until after he was suspended. He
testified that he did not make this disclosure because he did not know that her insurance
coverage would cost NYRA more money, that it was not "foremost in his mind" because
of medical problems affecting his wife and family, and because Dena told him that she
was going to go to college in September 2000 although, in fact, she did not.
Diane Mehrtens was also called as a witness by NYRA. She testified that her
memory was permanently faulty due to chemotherapy treatments she had received that
ended in 1993, but neither she nor the Union offered any evidence in support of that
statement.
Diane testified that she faxed the Spring 2000 registration form to James
Alexander, Other than perhaps filling in Dena's phone number and her social security
number, she testified that she did not otherwise fill in any other information on that form
and did not know where her husband had obtained the form which he gave to her. She
testified that she did not sign Dena's name on the registration form and that the address of
"Elmont NY" was not her handwriting.
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On the student questionnaire , Diane wrote in the direction at the top to change
Dena's status from child to student and included information on that form pertaining to
Dena's birthdate, her relationship ("Daughter"), the college name and address, but she
testified she did not date the form "1/18."
Diane testified that at the time she faxed the forms, she did not know whether
Dena was enrolled in college. She, too, learned that Dena was not attending college by
the end of January 2000 or early February 2000, but did not notify NYRA of that fact.
Although she knew Dena could not be covered, she testified that she had no obligation to
notify NYRA because the insurance plan was her husband's, not hers.
According to Patricia Cerda, a NYRA employee, in March 2001, Diane attempted
to obtain an ID badge from her. When Cerda asked if she was working, Diane told Cerda
"Yes, I went to arbitration." As Diane was not on the eligible list, Cerda said she would
have to check with a supervisor. Diane told her not to do so because she did not want the
Employer to know she was on the grounds. After Diane said she would "try another
time," she left the facility.
The Employer also called as a witness Robert W. Lesnevich, a forensic document
examiner, who was qualified as an expert in that field. Lesnevich examined certain of the
documents in issue and offered certain opinions and conclusions with respect to them.
Lesnevich opined that the signature of the school official on the student
questionnaire form and the spring 2000 registration form were the same and were not
authentic.
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Lesnevich testified that the school insignia at the top of the spring registration
form, and the College's name, address and phone number were added to the registration
form, hi addition, the student signature on that form was "in all probability not the
signature of Dena McAleavey." Moreover, he opined that the "D" in "Dena" as it
appears on the registration form is similar hi formation to the "D" in "Diane Mehrtens"
signature as it appears on documents bearing Diane Mehrtens' authentic signature, hi
Lesnevich's opinion, certain letters in Dena's signature on the registration form had no
similarity to letters in her signature on documents bearing her true signature.
The Employer subpoenaed Dena McAleavey to appear and testify at the
arbitration hearing, but despite a judicial order for her to appear, she did not.

OPINION
These are cases of alleged fraud to which attach certain accepted principles.
First, the quantum of proof is clear and convincing evidence. That standard
reflects the majority view of arbitrators, including mine as expressed during the hearing.
The Employer concedes that this is the applicable standard. Some arbitrators apply a
simple preponderance of the evidence standard in cases of this type and others require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As I indicated during the hearing, I do not regard either
to be the correct or majority view. Therefore, I will apply a "clear and convincing"
standard which for me, as I have repeatedly stated in numerous decisions, requires proof
that convinces me that the offense charged has been committed, hi other words, this
standard is not satisfied unless there is a high probability that the facts alleged are true.
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Second, upon proof of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, summary
discharge is appropriate. An employer has the right to the receipt of honest and accurate
records from employees which have a direct financial impact upon the employer. An
intentional falsification of those records for private gain is theft warranting discharge for
a first offense no matter the employee's work record.
Third, the elements of fraud, as correctly summarized by the Employer, are as
follows:
1. False representation by affirmative act or omission;
2. Employer reliance on the representation;
3. Scienter i.e. employee knowledge of falsity with intent to deceive; and
4. Damages
As the Employer also correctly argues, all but the scienter element are established
beyond any reasonable doubt upon this record and the facts underlying those three
elements were actually known to the Employer at the date the Mehrtens were terminated.
The documents filed by the Mehrtens were in fact false as of the date those
documents were completed and filed. Dena had never attended Briarcliffe or any other
college and had not enrolled for the Spring 2000 semester or thereafter. I reject as
unfounded the Union's suggestion that the College's record system was faulty. There is
no reasonable likelihood that the searches conducted by the College would have failed to
produce evidence of Dena's application, enrollment or attendance had any of those acts
taken place. The Employer relied upon the information supplied by the Mehrtens to
continue Dena's health care coverage which would otherwise have been ended as of
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December 31, 1999. The continuation of that coverage on and after January 1, 2000 both
burdened the Employer financially and benefited the employees.
The Employer asks that the scienter element be evaluated under a negative
inference drawn against both James and Diane Mehrtens because Dena refused to appear
despite subpoena and judicial order.
A party's failure to call as a witness an available person who is under that party's
control who can testify about material facts creates an inference adverse to that party.6 If
these conditions are satisfied, the trier of fact is permitted to draw the strongest inference
against that party which the record evidence permits.7 There are, however, questions as
to whether the conditions for drawing an adverse inference against either or both
employees have been satisfied in this case.
Given the nature of the allegations made by the Employer, Dena McAleavey faced
the possibility of a criminal prosecution for insurance fraud. That being so, Dena likely
would have been able to invoke a constitutional right against giving testimony which
could incriminate her. It is at least arguable in these circumstances that Dena was not a
witness available to either of the Mehrtens.
Second, the witness must be under the party's control before an adverse inference
is permissible. In that regard, a relative of a party is presumptively within the control of
rt

that party. In this case, however, Dena at the time of these hearings was an emancipated
adult who was not residing with the Mehrtens. Whether in these circumstances Dena can

6

Fisch, New York Evidence (2d ed, 1977) §1126 at pp. 635-38.

7 Id
8 Id.
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be fairly regarded as under either or both of the Mehrtens' control is again at least open to
reasonable debate.
Ultimately, however, it becomes unnecessary for me to decide whether an adverse
inference could be properly drawn on the facts.9 Even were an inference adverse to both
Mehrtens drawn, the record read most favorably to the Employer does not clearly and
convincingly establish that either employee forged any documents in an effort to defraud
the Employer or conspired for that purpose and to that end.
A disposition of these charges must begin with an identification of the basis upon
which the Mehrtens were discharged, and a discussion of what evidence may be properly
considered in evaluating whether either discharge was for just cause.
The Mehrtens were discharged upon the same ground. The Employer concluded
after investigation that each separately and together had acted dishonestly and had
defrauded the company by obtaining health insurance benefits for Dena. Whether this
accusation is characterized as theft, dishonesty or fraud is largely immaterial. No matter
how the misconduct is characterized, the misconduct alleged centers on intent. The
Employer alleges that the Mehrtens knew Dena was not eligible for health insurance
benefits but fabricated documents to misrepresent her student status so they could secure
those benefits. Therefore, guilt necessitates proof that the Mehrtens either individually,
or together in conspiracy, acted deliberately to defraud the Employer by obtaining
benefits they knew they were not entitled to receive.

9

It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to consider the Union's allegation that Dena was never served.
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The next issue is what evidence may properly be considered in assessing whether
the Employer has satisfied its burden of proof. Is all of the record evidence competent or
only that part of the record which is coextensive with the evidence the Employer actually
had in its possession at the date it discharged the Mehrtens? The Union argues that the
issue as stipulated allows for a consideration of only the latter. According to the Union,
"after acquired" evidence is immaterial to the issue of whether the discharges were for
just cause. Were the Union's argument to be accepted, the testimony of the Mehrtens, for
example, would be immaterial to the issue of their guilt or innocence because the
Mehrtens were not interviewed by the Employer before they were discharged. Similarly,
the expert's testimony would be immaterial because there is no evidence in the record
that he had been consulted and had reported to the Employer the findings to which he
testified before the date the employees were discharged. The Employer argues that the
"post discharge" or "after acquired" evidence is admissible because it is relevant to the
acts or grounds for the discharge.
The Union's argument raises substantial issues, but they need not be resolved in
this case. Even when the entirety of the record evidence is considered, I must conclude
that the Employer has not clearly and convincingly established that either employee
intentionally defrauded the Employer or acted dishonestly in filing the documents
pursuant to which Dena's health insurance coverage was continued.
hi evaluating the entire record, I have not disregarded the Mehrtens' testimony
about the few statements they claim were made to them by Dena. The Employer argues
that I should not consider them because the statements are hearsay and because it would
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be unfair to the Employer were Dena's statements to be considered because she refused
to appear and the Mehrtens did nothing to try to have the daughter testify.
As to the first ground, the statements are admissible even if hearsay, which they at
least arguably are not, because they are not offered for the truth of their content, but to
evidence the employees' state of mind. As to the claimed unfairness, it was the
Employer which called the Mehrtens as witnesses over the objection of counsel for the
Union. The Employer cannot, in that circumstance, have me consider the Mehrtens'
testimony to the extent it tends to evidence their guilt but exclude that testimony to the
extent it is exculpatory.
When all of the record evidence and all of the Employer's arguments are
considered, what is established is that the information on the forms which led to Dena's
continued coverage was false. She was not attending college. Falsity, forgery and
alteration of documents is established, but without sufficient evidence that either James
or Diane Mehrtens fabricated those documents or filed those forms with knowledge that
the information contained therein was false when they were filed. Upon this record, it is
entirely possible that Dena was the one who "doctored" the forms and forged the college
official's signatures on those documents. Dena could well have duped her parents for a
while even though she was then living with them. It appears from this record that Dena
had an interest in graphic design and likely possessed enough skill to "cut and paste"
documents together. Moreover, the information on the forms is of a type that could have
come only from a person who had some familiarity with college courses or possessed
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copies of Briarcliffe's course catalog. This is much more probably Dena than her
parents.
The Employer argues that the unexplained absence of the originals of the two
documents that were faxed to it by Diane Mehrtens greatly evidences the employees'
guilt. It claims that the reason there are only the faxed transmissions is because the
originals were "cut and paste" jobs that would have shown unquestionably that the
employees either doctored the forms themselves or knew they were doctored. But what
was faxed, however, could well have been a copy of the original "cut and paste job"
given them by Dena. Again, no matter how much one might suspect some misconduct by
one or the other of the employees, that suspicion cannot substitute for the clear and
convincing evidence required in a case such as this.
The only clear linkage of either employee to an act of forgery is the expert's
testimony that "Dena's" signature on the school registration form was not hers and that
the letter "D" in that signature was "similar" in formation to the letter "D" appearing in
two examples of Diane Mehrtens' known signatures.
The expert did not opine, however, that Diane Mehrtens had actually signed
Dena's name on the college registration form. His testimony stops short of that
conclusion. Although there is some reason to believe from the expert's testimony that
Diane Mehrtens did sign her daughter's name on that document, the evidence falls short
of the clear and convincing evidence needed in a case of this type. Moreover, even if it
were found that Diane Mehrtens did make Dena's signature on that form, that would not
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establish that Diane Mehrtens was also the one who placed the information on that form
regarding Dena's alleged, but false, enrollment at Briarcliffe.
It is unquestionably true and most troubling, however, that although the
submission of the forms may have been innocent when they were filed, both Mehrtens
subsequently learned that Dena was not enrolled and was not attending college. They
knew this to a certainty by early February 2000 at the latest, but did not disclosejhis
information to the Employer such that their daughter's coverage was continued.
This failure to disclose known information was not specifically included in the
charges which led to the terminations. The failure to include that specification owes
substantially, if not entirely, to the fact that neither Mehrtens was interviewed by the
Employer before they were discharged. Thus, the Employer did not know what the
Mehrtens knew and when they knew it until the Mehrtens were called as witnesses by the
Employer at an unemployment insurance hearing and during these hearings. It found out
about the failure to disclose known information after the employees were discharged.
Although the Employer was under no obligation to interview the employees, it
bears the consequences for having chosen not to do so. Although the charges are framed
broadly to include unspecified acts of "dishonesty and fraud" those terms can only have
the meaning they had to the Employer at the time the charges were levied. At that time,
the dishonesty and fraud were based upon the filing of what the Employer regarded to be
"faked" forms. It knew only that the information on the forms regarding Dena's student
status was false. She was not in school. It then concluded that the Mehrtens had lied
about the information that was supplied and that they were the ones who altered the
20

forms and forged various signatures. The Employer's subsequent discovery of the fact
that the Mehrtens failed to disclose that Dena was not enrolled after they knew that she
was not attending school could not possibly have been within the scope of the acts of
"dishonesty or fraud" alleged in the charges upon which the employees were dismissed
because the Employer simply did not have the information nor did it make that particular
allegation of misconduct at the date of discharge.
The Employer also alleges that after the employees were discharged, illegitimate
insurance claims for Diane, Dena and James' married daughter, Jennifer Mehrtens
Moskowitz, were submitted under James' policy. Those allegations, of course, are not
part of the charges before me. Thus, I express no opinion as to whether either or both of
the employees can be disciplined upon those grounds. However, the Employer
apparently relies upon this particular post-discharge activity to attack the Mehrtens'
credibility and/or to evidence their willingness or predisposition to engage in fraudulent
acts regarding health insurance coverage. For either purpose, the evidence is relevant,
but not dispositive, as to the allegations involving Dena's coverage. That evidence, like
the balance of the record, is ultimately unpersuasive of a conclusion that either Mehrtens
forged documents for the purpose of continuing Dena's health insurance coverage or
knew that they had been "doctored" to reflect information they knew to be false when
those documents were filed. The evidence as to these other insurance claims on this
record does not establish that either James or Diane submitted those claims or knew that
they had been submitted by the service providers on their behalf or on behalf of the
children.
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No different or greater weight is afforded Diane's efforts to obtain an ID badge.
As the Union was appealing the discharge, she might well have believed it was
appropriate to request an employee identification. That she did not want the employer's
agents to know about her inquiry reflects little more than a desire to avoid a
confrontation. Neither the inquiry nor the statements can supply the clear and convincing
evidence of insurance fraud, whether considered individually or in the context of the
entire record.
When all examinations of the record are concluded, even in the light most
favorable to the Employer, what is established is that information filed was in fact false,
certain forms were "doctored," and certain signatures were forged. What is not
established within the applicable clear and convincing standard is that either Mehrtens
knew the information was false when it was submitted to the Employer or that either of
them doctored the forms or forged signatures or knew of those acts or assisted in and with
those acts. Dena and/or another person or persons unknown could well have done
everything which the Employer alleges to be fraudulent and dishonest. Without clear and
convincing evidence establishing either Mehrtens' involvement either directly, or in
conspiracy with others, I am constrained to dismiss the charges against each for failure of
proof.
REMEDY
Having found that the record does not prove either employee's guilt under the
charges lodged against them leaves the issue of remedy.
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Considering of all relevant circumstances, both James and Diane Mehrtens are
conditionally reinstated to their former positions, but without back pay.
The reinstatement of both James Mehrtens and Diane Mehrtens shall not be
effective until the date both the Employer and the insurance carrier are reimbursed any
monies paid by either as a consequence of Dena McAleavey's continued health care
coverage on and after February 1, 2000, the date by which both employees'
acknowledged they knew Dena was not eligible for coverage.
In deciding whether back pay is appropriate, the issue as framed by counsel for the
parties affords me the power, notwithstanding any limitations which might otherwise
exist, to grant or withhold that relief, or any other, in light of all relevant circumstances.
A back pay remedy is, at least in part, equitable in nature. Therefore, in considering
whether to grant or deny back pay in whole or in part, I am allowed to consider the
equities and those equities do not favor back pay for either employee.
Although the employees' guilt or innocence cannot be based upon their failure to
disclose the fact that Dena was not hi school because the grounds for discharge could not
have encompassed that allegation, I am not obliged to ignore that admission in shaping
the appropriate remedy. Without unnecessary elaboration, I find the employees' several
explanations for this failure of notification to be entirely unsupported, wholly
unpersuasive and partially inconsistent. As both employees all but admit, they knew they
should have disclosed that information but did not and thereby continued to receive
benefits they knew they were not entitled to receive.
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AWARD
The discharge of James Mehrtens was not for just cause. James Mehrtens is
reinstated to his former position without back pay or lost benefits, such reinstatement to
be effective upon the date at which both the Employer is repaid any monies paid by it as a
consequence of Dena McAleavey's continued health insurance coverage on and after
February 1, 2000, and the date the health insurance carrier is repaid any monies it paid
service providers under insurance claims submitted by or on behalf of Dena McAleavey
on or after February 1, 2000.
The discharge of Diane Mehrtens was not for just cause. Diane Mehrtens is
reinstated to her former position without back pay or lost benefits, such reinstatement to
be effective upon the date at which both the Employer is repaid any monies paid by the
Employer as a consequence of Dena McAleavey's continued health insurance coverage
on and after February 1, 2000, and the date the health insurance carrier is repaid any
monies it paid service providers under insurance claims submitted by or on behalf of
Dena McAleavey on or after February 1, 2000.
The Employer is to specify the amounts to be repaid to it and its insurance carrier
promptly.
I will retain jurisdiction as to remedy should there be allegation that the Employer
unreasonably delayed notification of the monies owed or there is disagreement as to the
amounts actually owed by the employees.
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Dated:
Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
State of New York

)
)ss:
County of New York )
I hereby affirm pursuant to CPLR 7507 that I am the individual described herein
and who executed this instrument which is my Award.

Dated:
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
RULING
LOCAL 3 IBEW
-and-

THE NEW YORK RACING ASSOCIATION, INC.
-X

A hearing was held on November 5, 2001 on the following
question:
Whether my Award of July 7, 2001 was complied
with and/or whether I had any continuing
retained jurisdiction.
Representatives of the above-named parties appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived and a stenographic record of the hearing was taken.
The Union asks that I rule that JAMES MEHRTENS was not
reinstated; that the Employer's act to do so was "sham," and that
therefore my Award of July 7, 2001, ordering his reinstatement
was not complied with.
Whether Mr. Mehrtens was or was not reinstated; whether
his suspension on July 19th was a continuation

of his earlier

discharge; whether the charges on which the suspension was based
are new and different from what I ruled on in the July 7th Award,

or pretextual to camouflage the Employer's intent to prevent his
reinstatement, are matters not within'my retained

jurisdiction.

In my Award of July 7th, I retained jurisdiction only
as to monies Mehrtens was to repay to the Employer and to the
insurance

carriers

for

certain

health

insurance

coverage.

Specifically I stated:

"I shall retain jurisdiction as to remedy
should there be allegations that the Employer
unreasonably
delayed notification of the
monies owed or there is disagreement as to
the amounts actually owed by (Mehrtens).
It

is

not

disputed

that

the

Employer

and/or

the

insurance carrier supplied the amounts due and that Mehrtens made
payment thereof.
that

So that part of my Award was satisfied, and

is all to which

my

retained and continued

jurisdiction

applied.
The Union
review

compliance

reinstatement.
authority.

argues
with

that
my

I have implied

Award

that

authority

ordered

to

Mehrtensr

I conclude that I have no such implied, retained

Except

for the foregoing

explicit

reservation

of

jurisdiction I am functus officio.
Therefore any dispute over Mehrtens' reinstatement or
non-reinstatement

must

be

determined either

in

an

action to

enforce my Award judicially or by referral of that issue jointly

by the parties either to me or to another arbitrator, or by a
court order remanding the issue to me.
Also,

disputes

over

the

present

charges

against

Mehrtens, on which his present "suspension" is based, as well as
the propriety of his "suspended" status, are matters which may
also be referred to me or another arbitrator by joint agreement
of the parties.
grievance

by

Or, those matters may be the subject of a new

the

Union,

which

may

be

processed

under

the

grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.
In

connection

with

the

foregoing

procedure,

the

substantive rights of the parties are expressly reserved.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

November 15, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

If Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
LOCAL 342-50,
UNION,

CONSENT AWARD
Case #133000058801

-and-

OSSIE'S OF BORO PARK,
EMPLOYER,
(Grievance:

Group Grievance)

-X

The Undersigned has been named arbitrator of the abovecaptioned matter pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
("the contract" or "the Agreement") between UNITED FOOD AND
COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 342-50 ("LOCAL 342-50" or "the Union")
and OSSIE'S OF BORO PARK ("OSSIE'S" or "the Employer").
On or about May 10, 2001, LOCAL 342-50 filed a demand
for arbitration pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement
with OSSIE'S; said demand was docketed by the American
Arbitration Association as AAA Case No. 13 300 0058801.

The

issues, as agreed to by the parties at the arbitration, are:
1. Whether the Employer violated Article XXII
of the contract by denying the Union access

to its premises and bargaining unit
employees and to records requested by the
Union?
2. Whether the Employer violated Article III
of the contract by failing to pay employees
at the proper rate?
3. Whether the Employer violated Articles I,
II, and XXII of the contract by interfering
with employees becoming union members in
good standing?
4. Whether the Employer violated Article II of
the contract by failing to notify the Union
of the need for new help and failing to
permit the Union an opportunity to refer
individuals for employment prior to the
Employer hiring new employees?
5. With respect to issues 1-4, if the Employer
violated the contract, what shall be the
remedy?
LOCAL 342-50 and OSSIE'S have now agreed and consented
to issuance of the following Award:
AWARD
1.

On November 27, 2001, LOCAL 342-50 representatives

shall be permitted access to OSSIE'S for the purpose of assisting

employees who are not presently union members to become union
members.

It is anticipated that, at that time, the following

full-time employees shall execute union membership applications
and dues checkoff authorizations:
Guadalupe
Gil
Alejandro Garcia
Luis
Martin Rivas
Alej andro
Miguel Martinez
Walter
Victor Serrano Coriver
Should these employees fail to execute cards on November 27,
2001, they shall be dismissed from employment by OSSIE'S and not
rehired unless they execute a card within seven days thereafter
or are referred for employment through the LOCAL 342-50 hiring
hall.
2.

The Undersigned shall be present at OSSIE'S

November 27, 2001 to ensure that union representatives are
provided the full access to OSSIE'S required by the Agreement
and that there is no undue disruption to OSSIE'S operations.
3.

OSSIE'S agrees to waive the probationary period

with respect to the employees identified -i_n paragraph 1 and to
apply the Agreement with respect to these employees
retroactively to October I, 2001.

Without waiving any claim by

any employee to additional wages, benefits, or seniority, the
parties agree as follows:
a. The employees who execute membership cards
shall be assigned a seniority date of
October 1, 2001.
b. OSSIE'S shall make benefits contributions,
or payments in lieu thereof in accordance
with the Agreement, on behalf of the
employees identified in paragraph 1
retroactive to October 1, 2001.
c. OSSIE'S shall make back wage payments on
behalf of all employees, including the
employees identified in paragraph 1 and
existing union members, of $280 per
employee, with a copy of the payments to
LOCAL 342-50.

OSSIE'S shall make 8

monthly payments in equal amounts
commencing on November 30, 2001 to satisfy
the obligation.
4.

On or before January 1, 2002, LOCAL 342-50

representatives shall be permitted access to OSSIE'S for the
purpose of discussing with employees the benefits provided by
the Local 342 Seafood Division Welfare Fund, and each employee's
option to execute a waiver of welfare benefits and instead

receive cash payments as set forth in the Agreement.
LOCAL 342-50 and LOCAL 342-50 representatives shall be provided
an opportunity to meet with any employee who indicates an intent
to execute a waiver prior to the execution of the waiver.
5.

OSSIE'S shall not subcontract bargaining unit

6.

OSSIE'S agrees to comply with all of the terms of

work.

the Agreement, including but not limited to seeking referrals
for new help from LOCAL 342-50 in accordance with Article II,
payment of wages in accordance with Article III, payment of
overtime in accordance with Article IV, and permitting LOCAL
342-50 representatives to visit OSSIE'S places of business and
inspect books and records and meet with employees for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the Agreement is being properly
observed in accordance with Article XXII.
7.

OSSIE'S shall keep and preserve time records of

hours worked by bargaining unit employees utilizing an objective
time recording mechanism.

OSSIE'S shall make such records

available upon request for inspection by LOCAL 342-50
representatives.
8.

Any layoffs shall be in accordance with the

collective bargaining agreement, including but not limited to
Article VI.

It is, however, acknowledged that the seasonal

nature of OSSIE1' manpower needs (as it is a Kosher vendor,

catering to an orthodox and conservative Jewish clientele) may
require bulk layoffs during non-holiday preparation periods.
Provided, this paragraph does not create any right to employ
seasonal or temporary employees.
9.

Nothing herein shall be construed as a finding or

admission by OSSIE'S of any violation of the Agreement.
10.

OSSIE'S shall indemnify LOCAL 342-50 for any

costs (including damages and reasonable attorneys' fees)
incurred resulting from any employee(s) of OSSIE'S pursuing a
claim(s) against LOCAL 342-50 for breach of its duty of fair
representation concerning back wages, benefits, or seniority, or
other failure to enforce contractual rights for any time period
from March 1, 2000 to the date of this Consent Award, whether or
not designated as claim for breach of the duty of fair
representation.
11.

This Consent Award shall become final and LOCAL

342-50'S grievance shall be deemed resolved four months after
the execution of this Consent Award, provided that OSSIE'S
complies with its obligation to permit LOCAL 342-50
representatives to visit OSSIE'S places of business and inspect
books and records and meet with employees for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the Agreement is being properly observed
during that period.

Upon any denial of access within that

period, LOCAL 342-50 may reopen the arbitration and seek all

relief as well as payment by OSSIE'S of the arbitrator's full
fee for any additional proceedings.

The Undersigned shall

retain jurisdiction during the aforementioned four-month period
to resolve any dispute arising under the terms of this Consent
Award or any claim of non-compliance with this Consent Award.
12.

This Consent Award is non-precedential and shall

not be cited in any other proceeding, except a proceeding to
enforce its terms.

Eric J./Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

NOVEMBER 30, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
AAA Case No. 13 300 00588 01
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION BETWEEN
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
LOCAL 342-50,
Union,
- and -

Eric Schmertz,
Arbitrator

OSSIE'S OF BORO PARK,
Employer.
(Grievance: Group Grievance)

CONSENT AWARD

The undersigned has been named arbitrator of the abovecaptioned matter pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
("the contract" or "the Agreement") between United Food and
Commercial Workers Local 342-50 ("Local 342-50" or "the Union")
and Ossie's of Boro Park ("Ossie's" or "the Employer").
On or about May 10, 2001, Local 342-50 filed a demand
for arbitration pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement
with Ossie's; said demand was docketed by the American
Arbitration Association as AAA Case No. 13 300 00588 1.

The

issues, as agreed to by the parties at the arbitration, are:
1.

Whether the Employer violated Article XXII of the
contract by denying the Union access to its
premises and bargaining unit employees and to
records requested by the Union?

2.

Whether the Employer violated Article III of the
contract by failing to pay employees at the proper
rate?

3.

Whether the Employer violated Articles I, II, and
XXII of the contract by interfering with employees
becoming union members in good standing?

4.

Whether the Employer violated Article II of the
contract by failing to notify the Union of the
need for new help and failing to permit the Union
an opportunity to refer individuals for employment
prior to the Employer hiring new employees?

5.

With respect to issues 1-4, if the Employer
violated the contract, what shall be the remedy?

Local 342-50 and Ossie's have now agreed and consented
to issuance of the following Award.
AWARD

I.

On November 27, 2001, Local 342-50 representatives

shall be permitted access to Ossie's for the purpose of assisting
employees who are not presently union members to become union
members.

It is anticipated that, at that time, the following

full-time employees shall execute union membership applications
and dues checkoff authorizations:
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Should these employees fail to execute cards on November 27,
2001, they shall be dismissed from employment by Ossie's and not
rehired unless they execute a card within seven days thereafter
or are referred for employment through the Local 342-50 hiring

2.

The undersigned shall be* prcaontt at. oc cie* C' on
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November 27, 2001 to ensure that union representatives are
provided the full access to Ossie's required by the Agreement and
that there is no undue disruption to Ossie's operations.
3.

Ossie's agrees to waive the probationary period

with respect to the employees identified in paragraph 1 and to
apply the Agreement with respect to these employees retroactively
to October 1, 2001.

Without waiving any claim by any employee to

additional wages, benefits, or seniority, the parties agree as
follows:
a.

The employees who execute membership cards shall
be assigned a seniority date of October 1, 2001.

b.

Ossie's shall make benefits contributions, or
payments in lieu thereof in accordance with the
Agreement, on behalf of the employees identified
in paragraph 1 retroactive to October 1, 2001.

c.

Ossie's shall make back wage payments on behalf of
all employees, including the employees identified
in paragraph 1 and existing union members, of
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per employee, with a copy of the payments to Local
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4.

November 30, Qfcol T9
On or beforej^tHHE/ Local 342-50 representatives

shall be permitted access to Ossie's for the purpose of
discussing with employees the benefits provided by the Local 342
Seafood Division Welfare Fund, and each employee's option to
execute a waiver of welfare benefits and instead receive cash
payments as set forth in the Agreement.

Local 342-50 shall

provide waiver forms acceptable to Local 342-50 and Local 342-50
representatives shall be provided an opportunity to meet with any
employee who indicates an intent to execute a waiver prior to the
execution of the waiver.
5.

Ossie's shall not subcontract bargaining unit

6.

Ossie's agrees to comply with all of the terms of

work.

the Agreement, including but not limited to seeking referrals for
new help from Local 342-50 in accordance with Article II, payment
of wages in accordance with Article III, payment of overtime in
accordance with Article IV, and permitting Local 342-50
representatives to visit Ossie's places of business and inspect
books and records and meet with employees for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the Agreement is being properly observed in
accordance with Article XXII.
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7.

Ossie's shall keep and preserve time records of

hours worked by bargaining unit employees utilizing an objective
time recording mechanism.

Oss-ie's shall make such records

available upon request for inspection by Local 342-50
representatives.
8.

Any layoffs shall be in accordance with the

collective bargaining agreement, including but not limited to
Article VI.

It is, however, acknowledged that the seasonal

nature of Ossie's manpower needs (as it is a Kosher vendor,
catering to an orthodox and conservative Jewish clientele) may
require bulk layoffs during non-holiday preparation periods.
Provided, this paragraph does not create any right to employ
seasonal or temporary employees.
9.

Nothing herein shall be construed as a finding or

admission by Ossie's of any violation of the Agreement.
10.

Ossie's shall indemnify Local 342-50 for any costs

(including damages and reasonable attorneys' fees) incurred
resulting from any employee(s) of Ossie's pursuing a claim(s)
against Local 342-50 for breach of its duty of fair
representation concerning back wages, benefits, or seniority, or
other failure to enforce contractual rights for any time period
from March 1, 2000 to the date of this Consent Award, whether or
not designated as a claim for breach of the duty of fair
representation.
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11.

This Consent Award shall become final and Local

342-50's grievance shall be deemed resolved four months after the
execution of this Consent Award, provided that Ossie's complies
with its obligation to permit Local 342-50 representatives to
visit Ossie's places of business and inspect books and records
and meet with employees for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the Agreement is being properly observed during that period.
Upon any denial of access within that period, Local 342-50 may
reopen the arbitration and seek all relief as well as payment by
Ossie's of the arbitrator's full fee for any additional
proceedings.

The undersigned shall retain jurisdiction during

the aforementioned four month period to resolve any dispute
arising under the terms of this Consent Award or any claim of
non-compliance with this Consent Award.
12.

This Consent Award is non-precedential and shall

not be cited in any other proceeding, except a proceeding to
enforce its terms.
LOCAL 342-50

OSSIE'S OF BORQ PARK

By:_

Eric /S^hmertz
Arbitrator
Sworn to before me this
day of November, 2001
Notary Public

-6-

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 I.B.E.W.

Case #1330000669-01

P.S. MARCATO ELEVATOR CO. INC.
-X

At the duly scheduled hearing on August 9, 2001, the
above-named Employer failed to appear despite due notice.
The

above-named Union's motion

to proceed

with

the

hearing was granted and the proofs and allegations of the Union
were heard.
The issue is:
May the Employer deduct the parking
tickets of other employees from the
vacation pay owed to the grievant,
PETER BALZANO?
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived as was the contractual
tripartite

Board

Undersigned

of Arbitration.

The case was heard by the

as sole arbitrator, duly selected by and under the

Rules of the American Arbitration Association, as provided by the
collective bargaining agreement between the parties.
By its own document, which I deem authentic and which I
admitted into evidence as Union Exhibit #1, the Employer admits
that it owes the grievant vacation pay in the gross amount of
$1,043.10.

From that amount the Employer made two gross

deductions

—

$360.50,

parking tickets.

for FICA

and taxes,

and $811.00 for

The latter were incurred by the truck

from

which the grievant made emergency elevator repairs on behalf of
the Employer, but driven not by the grievant (who doesn't possess
a driver's license) but by a helper assigned to the grievant for
the driving and to assist in the repairs.

The two deductions

exceeded the gross vacation pay by $128.40.
The

Union

asserts

tickets are unlawful under

that
Section

the

deductions

for

parking

193 of the New York State

Labor Law and otherwise not the responsibility or liability of
the grievant because his helper, not he, drove and parked the the
truck and that each ticket was the result of performing the work
assigned

by

the

Employer,

namely

elevator

repairs,

almost

invariably on an emergency basis.
It is enough for me to rule, as I do, that vacation pay
is "wages" within the meaning of Section 193 of the Labor Law and
that parking ticket

fines

are not

among

the

items

for which

deductions from wages or vacation pay may be made.
Whether the helper(s), the Employer or the grievant are
liable

for payment

of those

fines

in any other

before me and I make no determinations thereof.
absence of the Employer
established

at the hearing,

forum is not
Indeed, in the

it has not even been

by sufficient evidence the quantity of the parking

tickets or that the fines amounted to $811.

However, the Union does not dispute nor do I doubt the
accuracy of the deductions for FICA and taxes leaving a net
vacation payment due of $682.60.

Accordingly, the Undersigned,

duly designated as the Arbitrator,

and having duly heard the

proofs and allegation of the Union, the Employer having failed to
appear after due notice, makes the following AWARD:

P.S. MARCATO ELEVATOR CO. INC. owes and is
directed to forthwith pay vacation pay to
PETER BALZANO in the net sum of $682.00.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

August 16, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

V

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD
LOCAL 282 I.B.T.

-andSOLOMON OLIVER MECHANICAL
V

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just
WINSTON BOODOO?
remedy?

cause for the discharge of
If not, what shall be the

A hearing was held at the offices of the Undersigned on
February 16, 2001 at which time Mr. Boodoo, the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named parties, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator makes the following AWARD:
Mr. Boodoo shall be reinstated as a truck
driver, but without back pay.
However, his reinstatement is conditioned on
the following:
1) That he possess a valid truck driver's
license;

2) That he possess the required paper's and/or
authorization from the Immigration Service
to lawfully be in the United States and to
be lawfully employed; and
3) That his reinstatement and assignment to
drive a truck do not present the Employer's
insurance carrier from insuring the
truck(s) he drives.

Eric J./Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

February 27, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
1199 NATIONAL HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
EMPLOYEES UNION

Case #13 3000091800

and-

ST. JOHN QUEENS HOSPITAL

-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the suspension and
discharge of BENJAMIN MARTINEZ? If not, what
shall be the remedy?
Hearings

were

held December

13th, 2000,

January

5;th
tri,

February 8th and February 15th, 2001; at which time, Mr. Martinez,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Hospital appeared.
afforded full opportunity

All concerned were

to offer evidence and argument and to

examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The grievant, while

a preceptor/clinical

coordinator

(and lead radiology technician) at the Hospital, is accused of
engaging,
sexually
radiology

on

his

explicit

initiative
and

technician

and

graphic
students

cafeteria on January 31, 2000.

virtually

one-sidedly,

conversation
over

lunch

with
in

the

two

in a
women

Hospital

The

Hospital

contends

that

his

sexually

explicit

remarks, with attendant physical gestures, were so unwelcome, so
coarse and obscene and so irrelevant to the students' course of
training

that

they

shocked

the

students,

and

caused

them

emotional distress.
Additionally, because the students were assigned to the
grievant

for training,

because

he

supervised

their

work

and

evaluated their progress and because he could have become one of
their instructors in the near future, his conduct was not only
unprofessional but constituted sexual harassment.
conduct

was

especially

egregious

because

one

And that his
of

the

women

students was only 18 years of age.
The principal Hospital witnesses were the two women
students and Hospital officials to whom the events were reported
and/or those who conducted the investigation.
The grievant places a different cast and interpretation
on what he did.

He asserts that his remarks and descriptions

were "clinical" or societal in nature, relating to an academic
study of a woman's anatomy, including

some medical methods of

falsifying virginity; to the sexual experience of his son, at 21
years of age, only to explain how undisciplined youths can later
mature to responsible adults
expressed concerns

(in response to the older student's

about her children).

He contends that his

"clinical"

remarks about the frequency of sexual activity were

willingly

responded

to

by

the older women student who

2

volunteered

examples

of

sexual

experiences

with

a

former

to

the

sexual

boyfriend.
He
preferences

denies

making

of younger

specific

women

references

and older women

and rejects the

students' assertion that his conduct was unwelcome, claiming that
they laughed with him at his statements and examples.
The grievant attributes the charges against him to an
organized campaign by the technicians under him in his department
(whom he characterizes as "thugs") to get him fired.

They, he

contends, exaggerated and miscast his lunch conversation with the
students, encouraged the students to formally complain for the
purpose

of

getting him

fired because

they

disliked

him,

and

circulated an unsigned letter demanding his termination to the
Hospital

authorities and to the training program

accreditation

agencies.
I find no reason in the record to disbelieve the two
students.

They testified forthrightly and unequivocally, though

it was obvious to me that such testimony, in which they recited
and

demonstrated

the

grievant's

graphic

and

explicit

sexual

remarks and gestures, caused them distress and discomfort.

I

find no reason why they would falsify or distort what happened.
Indeed, I consider it significant that they had
declined to file a formal complaint (after reporting the incident
verbally to Hospital management) and as witnesses expressed their
reluctance to have to testify.

I accept as truthful and

3

accurate not only their testimony of the event, but their
expressed statements that they didn't want to file a formal
complaint and had preferred not to testify because as students
they feared the consequences of a formal complaint on their
studies and careers, and only wanted "to complete their training
at the Hospital and leave."
To my

mind,

their

complete

and

detailed

testimony,

together with their expressed reluctance to do so, rebuts the
Union's assertion that the women were instrumentalities of the
technicians or part of a scheme to get the grievant fired.
short,

the

specific

truthfulness

allegations

technicians

of

stands

notwithstanding.

their

testimony

unimpeached,
Also,

supporting

the

I deem

motives

it

of

In
the
the

inconsequential

that the students may have "laughed" at what the grievant said.
It was the grievant who asked the students if he could join them
at

lunch.

Obviously,

as their supervisor

could not say "no" to him.

or preceptor,

they

And, I conclude that if they laughed

at what he said, it could well have been from nervousness and
embarrassment,

and to camouflage

their

discomfort

—

not as

evidence of willing participation.
Let me state unconditionally that I find the grievant's
behavior at that lunch to be reprehensible.

What he said and

what he demonstrated was obscene, unjustified and unwelcome.
caused the students emotional distress, manifest

It

embarrassment

generally, and confusion in the "teacher-student" relationship,
4

particularly.

In short,

the charge

against the grievant of

unprofessionalism is clearly proven.
But the grievant's discharge
unprofessionalism.

is not limited

to his

His conduct is also defined by the Hospital

as "sexual harassment" and as the latest episode in a "pattern of
behavior."
The Hospital's

letter of discharge addressed to the

grievant on March 22, 2000 states inter alia:
"...you
engaged
in
a
sexually
explicit
conversation
in
the
St.
John's
Queens
Hospital Cafeteria with two students who were
assigned to you.
This sexual conversation
entailed a reference that the students would
take classes with you as a faculty member in
their next calendar year of study (emphasis
added).
This assertion, as developed in the Hospital's case in
this arbitration, relates to the specific additional charge of
"sexual harassment."
The letter goes on to state inter alia:
"Interviews of X-ray staff and a review of
your personnel file indicate a pattern of
behavior that is indication of unprofessional
conduct" (emphasis added).
This statement, again as developed by the Hospital in
this arbitration,

is the additional charge of a "pattern of

behavior."
In short, the Hospital relied on three circumstances
in effectuating the grievant's discharge.

Unprofessionalism,

sexual harassment

and a "pattern of behavior"

as evidence of

both.
Though

the

charge

of

unprofessionalism

has

been

clearly and convincingly established, the latter two charges fail
short of the requisite standard of proof.

This is not to say

that the grievant would not have been suspended and discharged
for the

first offense -- unprofessionalism.

I do not

know.

Rather it is to say that three charges were presented as the
grounds for his termination, both in the discharge letter and in
the Hospital's case in this arbitration.

And that with that

choice and circumstance the burden is on the Hospital to prove,
clearly

and

discharge.
cause"

convincingly,
The

the

causes

stipulated issue

for the grievant's

for

is whether

suspension

the

grievant's

there was

and discharge.

"just

As

the

Hospital relies on three reasons as meeting the test of "just
cause," adequate proof of only one, considering other relevant
circumstances,

may be grounds

for mitigation of the discharge

penalty to something less.
The Hospital has not proven a "pattern of behavior."
It claims that the grievant engaged in incidents of "sexual
harassment" in 1993 and 1996.

However, neither of these

allegations were substantiated when they happened and neither
were proven in this arbitration.

The Hospital conceded that the

1993 allegation was "unsubstantiated" and I ruled therefore that
it was not a probative matter in this case.
6

No evidence was

offered by the Hospital in support of the 1996 allegation.

The

grievant testified about that incident on cross-examination.

His

explanation of that event in no way constituted factual sexual
harassment.

And that testimony was un-rebutted.

allegation is wholly without probative value.

So, the 1996

Rejecting as I do,

the allegations of 1993 and 1996, it is manifestly obvious that
no "pattern" of behavior or misbehavior, either of
unprofessionalism or sexual harassment has been proved.
charge is dismissed.

So, that

And that leaves the grievant's prior

disciplinary record over his 27 years of service, unblemished.
The
grievant's
assertion
evaluator
rank

charge

conduct
that

sexual

over

lunch,

the

grievant

harassment,
is

was

and potential instructor.

and power

"hostile

of

and

control

environment"

that

based
the

arising
on

the

students'

so

the

Hospital's
supervisor,

And that by his superior

over their studies he
was

from

sexually

created a

frightening

and

intimidating as to equate to "sexual harassment," then, for the
balance of their training program, and especially for the next
academic session when he could be their instructor.
My study of the law of sexual harassment persuades me
that no matter how

coarse,

obscene or reprehensible

was the

grievant's behavior over a lunch of about ^ hour duration, it did
not

rise

to

the

level

of

sexual

recognized in statutory or case law.

harassment

as defined

and

Circumstances constituting sexual harassment generally
fall into two categories —
environment."

the "quid pro quo" and the "hostile

The former, of course, is the demand, exchange or

offer of benefits

for sexual

favors, or reprisals

reprisals for rejection of such demands or offers.

or threat
There is no

credible evidence of a "quid pro quo" circumstance in this case.
A "hostile

environment" as defined by the statutory

Title VII and lead cases thereunder
"workplace

is

permeated

with

requires evidence that the

discrimination,

ridicule and insult that is sufficiently

intimidation,

severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of the victim's employment

and create an

abusive working environment" Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Service
Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
Forklift

Systems,

, 1185 Ct. 998, 1001 (1998) citing Harris v.
Inc.; 510 U.S.

17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370

(1993) Oncale makes clear that Title VII is strictly limited to
actual harassment based on sex (gender) and that it may not be
construed

to enact a federal code of civility.

Here, in my

judgement, the grievant's behavior was manifestly uncivil, but
fell short of creating the pervasive or severe hostility or the
discriminatory intimidation required for sexual harassment.
Assuming,

as

I

do,

that

the

students'

status

is

legally comparable to an "employment," it is speculative, at
best, that the grievant's conduct, limited to the lunch period,
had a nexus to their tenure as students, to their assignments, to
the grading of their work or to their ultimate success as

students.

Certainly the students were

emotionally distressed.

shocked, insulted and

But I do not think they felt a pervasive

hostility or threat; nor did their testimony so indicate.

Nor do

I find evidence that the grievant intended his remarks to be a
prelude to later intimidation, coercion or irregular influence.
Rather, I see it as a stupid and perverted act of misplaced
bravado confined to the lunch period.
Clearly,

severe

discipline

is

appropriate

grievant's misconduct and unprofessional!sin.

for

the

But with two of the

three charges against him unproved, and without a claim by the
Hospital

that the remaining charge would be "just

dismissal,

I consider

cause" for

it appropriate and consistent

with due

process that the arbitrator consider mitigation of the discharge
penalty.
Consideration
overall employment

involves

a

look

record and longevity.

service employee of 27 years.

at

the

grievant's

He has been a long

There is no evidence that his work

has been anything but satisfactory.

He has risen in rank to that

of lead technician, and supervises a group of technicians.
previously held, his prior disciplinary record is
These

consideration

lead

me

to

conclude

that

As

unblemished.
a

lengthy

disciplinary suspension from the date of his discharge on
March 22, 2000, to one year later, March 22, 2001 is the proper
penalty.

At the Hospital's option his reinstatement may be at

his previous location or at any of the Hospital's facilities.
9

Also,

at

the

Hospital's

option

and

sponsorship,

he

may

be

required to undertake sensitivity training and/or psychological
counseling.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of BENJAMIN MARTINEZ is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension of one year.
He shall be reinstated without back pay on
March 22, 2001, one year from the date of his
discharge.
At the Hospital's option and sponsorship, he
shall undergo sensitivity training or
psychological counseling.
Also, at the Hospital's option, his
reinstatement may be at his prior facility
or, if feasible, at any other location,
within the Hospital's facilities.

Eric J. /Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

March 9, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330000213-00

LOCAL 30 I.U.O.E. AFL-CIO

-andSTARRETT CITY ASSOCIATES

-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate the collective
bargaining agreement by assigning bargaining
unit duties of the lead Engineer to nonbargaining unit employees? If so, what shall
be the remedy?
Hearings were held on September 20th; and December 6th,
2000;

January

23rd,

and

March

16,

2001

at

which

time

representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
There is no dispute that beginning in March 1998 and
thereafter

in 1999 various duties performed by the bargaining

unit

Engineer

lead

assigned

to

over

managerial

a

or

twenty-five-year
supervisory

period

personnel,

were

re-

namely

the

Director and Assistant Director of the Employer's energy plant.

And that from the end of December 1999, when the incumbent Lead
ngineer was removed from that job because he failed to obtain a
required license the Lead Engineer job became and has remained
vacant, with

the

duties

thereof

assumed

by

the Director

and

Assistant Director.
What is in dispute is whether the assumption of the
Lead Engineer duties by the Director and Assistant Director and
the refusal of the Employer to fill the Lead Engineer position
with

a

bargaining

unit

employee

violated

the

collective

bargaining agreement.
There is no significant dispute over what the duties of
the Lead Engineer are or were.
The Job Description reads:
LEAD ENGINEER
Person in charge in absence of Director and
Assistant Director.
Responsible
for all
maintenance
in Power
Plant,
garages and
community
center, etc.
Lays out work,
assigning all persons to work duties. Orders
all supplies for mechanical
operation of
Plant.
Must be familiar with all phases of
Plant operation and maintenance.
The Employer describes the principal duties as:
"...to day out the work, assign all persons to
work duties, order all supplies and be in
charge in the absence of the Director and
Assistant Director.
In addition, the Lead
Engineer provides technical advice to the
employees."

The Union describes the basic duties as:
"...to determine what work needs to be done,
lay out the work, assign persons to work
duties, order all supplies for mechanical
operation of the plant, assist employees in
trouble shooting problems, oversee the work
performed, answer technical questions, assist
in complex maintenance and repairs and check
the work of the employees one completed."
I

deem the two foregoing descriptions

substantially

similar, at least for purposes of this case.
By a jointly negotiated memorandum of June 20, 1998,
the

parties

Montelione)

agreed
was

that

required

the
to

Lead

possess

Engineer
an

(then

operating

Anthony

Engineer's

license, (which Montelione failed to obtain by December 31, 1999,
and which caused his removal).

However, the first transfer of

duties

to

from

the

Lead

Engineer

the

Director

or Assistant

Director took place in March 1998.
A memo dated March 3, 1998 read:
From:

Vernon Douglas

Subject:

Power Plant

Date:

March 3, 1998

After a number of meetings regarding the
operation of the power plant, the following
is a list of processes that should facilitate
cooperative operation of the plant:
1.
There will be a daily afternoon meeting
between the director of the plant, the
assistant director and the lead engineer.
The purpose of the meeting will be to review
ongoing projects, prioritize and assign new
projects,- and create work orders as needed.
The director or assistant director will write

out the work orders to be distributed by the
lead engineer. If during the workday the lead
engineer deems it necessary to reassign
employees as it relates to the operation of
the plant, he would be allowed to do so based
on the following conditions:
a.

Non availability of either the director
the assistant director.

b.

An
emergency
situation
immediate attention.

that

or

requires

The lead engineer will notify
the
director or the assistant director within a
reasonable amount of time about the change in
assignments. The lead engineer will make
written
comments
on
the
work
order,
indicating what changes took place.
The lead engineer will also keep the
director and the assistant director updated
during the day as needed regarding the status
of the projects. The director, the assistant
director, and the lead engineer will meet
every morning to readjust work orders based
on any changes that took place overnight.
2.
There will be a weekly meeting between
the
director,
assistant
director,
lead
engineer, and the lead electrician to review
long-term
projects,
prioritize
overall
operation of the plant. The director will
have the final say on all assignments, work
orders, etc., and the overall operation of
the plant. In lieu of the director's absence,
the assistant director would have similar
responsibilities.
3.
To help create a positive
working
atmosphere and to resolve issues as they
relate to labor and management, there will be
a monthly meeting between the director and/or
assistant director, the shop stewards from
Local 3 and Local 30, and the director of
human resources to discuss and, hopefully,
resolve any problems that may arise.

With the implementation of this Memo, the Director and
Assistant Director assumed the threshold duties of determining
the

work

to

be

performed,

generated

the

authorized changes in the work assignments.
role

in

these

functions was

apparently

work

orders

and

The Lead Engineer's
changed

from

one

of

xclusive or primary responsibility to shared responsibility or
subordinate

responsibility

to

the

Director

and

Assistant

Director.
The

Employer

makes

the

point

that

these

changes

resulted from discussions with the Union and were not grieved by
Montelione or the Union.
Thereafter,
occurred.

in

February

1999,

a

further

change

On instructions from management, a new Director took

over the handing out of work orders to the employees, based on
computer generated Work Orders.

Soon thereafter the paper Work

Orders were discontinued and the employees received their work
assignments verbally from the Director or the Assistant Director.
What

remained

for the Lead Engineer was to provide

"technical assistance" to the employees and to order supplies and
prepare requisition forms.
However,

the

Employer

asserts

that

even

those

functions were not the Lead Engineer's exclusively, but that all
three,

the

Director,

the

Assistant

ordered supplies, and gave assistance.

Director

and Montelione,

The final shift of Lead Engineer duties occurred

on

and after December 31, 1999 when Montelione was removed from the
job (and demoted pursuant to an arbitration award) for failure to
obtain an operating engineer's license.

The Employer

that at that point the work that had remained

asserts

for Montelione

(about 50% of his original assignments) was not needed in a fulltime capacity.

Accordingly, what duties remained were taken over

by the Director or Assistant Director, and the Lead Engineer job
was not filled.
The Employer argues that the reassignment of the Lead
Engineer duties to the Director and Assistant Director was the
product not only of discussions with the Union, but was with the
Union's agreement.

I am not so persuaded.

of

and

February

effectuated
agreement

1999
by

was

the
the

December

Employer.
initial

31,

1999

The

or basic

Clearly the changes
were

unilaterally

only

possible

shift

in March

memorialized in the Memo of that date.

bilateral
1998,

as

Though clearly there were

discussions between the parties leading to that Memo, I find no
evidence that, in fact, it constituted bilateral negotiations.
Rather, I conclude that the Employer notified the Union of the
new and pre-eminent role of the Director and Assistant
but

neither

sought

nor

obtained

the

Union's

Director,

agreement.

I

conclude also that the Union did not then grieve because the Lead
Engineer job remained, was still occupied by a bargaining unit
employee who was paid his

full rate, regardless of any
6

diminution in his duties or responsibilities.

So, I reject the

.mployer's claim of Union agreement to the shift of duties.

At

most, the Union acquiesced, but did not, at that point, feel a
threat to the bargaining unit.
The Employer contends that its actions were consistent
with its managerial rights and, more specifically, its right to
sub-contract.
The

contractual

management

rights

clause

reads

in

pertinent part:
e.
The Employer
retains the usual and
customary management rights as the number and
distribution
of employees consistent with
efficient operations subject to the terms of
the agreement.
The sub-contracting clause reads:
a.

Sub-contracting

In the event that the employer desires to
sub-contract for work that previously had
been performed by members of this union or
falls within jurisdiction of this union, the
employer will notify the union at least one
(1) week prior to the effective date of its
contracting for such services and set forth
the name and address of the
contractor
provided; that in the event of an emergency
in regards to the operation of the Power
Plant or related facility, the employer shall
not be required to provide such notice.
In substance, the Employer argues that the shift in
the work from the Lead Engineer to the Director and Assistant
Director is not prohibited by the contract, remains a managerial

right under

(e) above and/or is in nature of

sub-contracting

within the meaning of (a) above.
Additionally, the Employer asserts that all the duties
of the Lead Engineer especially the principal or basic duties,
were performed regularly by the Director and Assistant Director
historically
Engineer.

on

And

a

joint

that

jurisdiction

therefore

in

jurisdiction of the Lead Engineer,

basis

the

with

absence

the

of

Lead

exclusive

the transfer of duties

from

the bargaining unit to the Director and Assistant Director did
not deprive the bargaining unit of any jurisdictional right to
the work.
I do not

see what happened here as

within the meaning of
and

obviously

traditionally

no

(a) above.

sub-contractor

means

No sub-contract was involved
was

contracting

sub-contracting

named.

bargaining

Sub-contracting
unit

work

to

different independent employer, usually out of the plant.
was not the case here.

a

That

The work remained in the plant and was

performed, not by an independent contractor, but by employees of
the Employer

namely the Director

and Assistant

Director,

In

short, the facts are much closer to the performance of bargaining
unit work by supervisory or managerial employees.
Nor,

in my view,

managerial right under

is this

(e) above.

no specific ban on the performance
non-bargaining

unit

the proper

exercise

Though the contract contains
of bargaining unit work by

personnel, it is well settled that an
8

of a

unrestricted

transfer

of bargaining unit work out of the unit

carries with it the power to damage or even destroy the certified
unit by whole sale removal of its jurisdictional work.

The well-

settled rule is that any such managerial power is restricted by
ontractually implied but logical and reasonable conditions.
I agree with the esteemed, late Saul Wallen who in
deciding a case similar to this stated:
"job security is an inherent element of the
labor
contract, a part of its very being if
wages is the heart of the labor agreement,
job security may be considered its soul.
Those eligible to share in the degree of job
security the contract affords, are those to
whom the contract applies.
The transfer of work customarily performed by
employees
in
the
bargaining
unit
must
therefore be regarded as an attack on the job
security of the employees whom the agreement
covers and therefore on one of the contract's
basic purposes."
(See Ekkouri & Elkourie:
How
Works - Fourth Edition pg. 549)

Arbitration

Hence, even in the absence of explicit restrictions on
sub-contracting or non-bargaining unit assignments of bargaining
unit work, arbitrators limit management's rights to circumstances
of bonafide business need, lack of skills of the unit employees
or

lack

of

equipment,

emergencies,

short-time

constraints,

adequate conditions of employment of the sub-contractor.

Transcending all these conditions is the rule that subontracting or transfer of work to non-bargaining unit employees
not be in derogation of or do damage to the bargaining unit.
Here,

these

exceptions were

based on the record before me.
purposes
enough

of managerial
to

deprive

the

control

present,

at

least

The Employer made the changes for
and efficiency.

bargaining

important and senior jobs.

not

unit

of

one

That
of

is not

its

more

The unit was damaged by that loss.

And it was not until that damage presented itself that the Union
needed to or was required to grieve.
In short, except for the exceptions noted, bargaining
unit work, so identified by contractually negotiated bargaining
unit job titles and descriptions belong with the unit so long as
the work is to be performed.
The remaining question is whether the duties of the
Lead Engineer have been exclusively bargaining unit work, subject
to the above rule.

For if, as a matter of practice, those duties

were performed jointly with managerial employees, bargaining unit
exclusively is lost and the work may be properly shifted back and
forth between the unit and non-unit employees.
In this case, the Employer argues joint jurisdiction.
I do not find it as a practice.

The Lead Engineer, with the full

original duties, had been in place for almost twenty-five years.
There is not persuasive evidence that performance of those duties
by

the

Director

and

Assistant Director pre-dated the March
10

1998 reorganization.
of managerial

The Employer has failed to show a practice

or supervisory activity in determining

the work,

its priority, laying out the work, or assigning it over the 24
years

prior

to March

1998.

Rather,

I deem

vidence of what the Director and Assistant
March 1998 on.

its testimony

as

Director did from

That the Director and Assistant Director may have

ordered supplies" and provided some "technical assistance" prior
to March 1998 is not enough to establish joint jurisdiction over
all or most of the work, as a practice.

Accordingly, I find that

until March 1998, the primary if not all the duties of the Lead
Engineer were performed exclusively by him and that therefore,
those duties fell within the exclusive contractual
of the Union.

And so long as those duties are to be performed/

they belong to the bargaining unit, subject
noted.

jurisdiction

to the exceptions

There is insufficient evidence of whether a particular

employee is entitled to the re-established job of Lead Engineer,
so no employee is so identified and no back pay is awarded.
The

Undersigned,

duly

designated

as

the Arbitrator,

and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer violated the collective
bargaining agreement by assigning Lead
Engineer bargaining unit duties to nonbargaining unit employees.

11

The Employer is directed to return those
duties to the bargaining unit and to the Lead
Engineer job.

Eric J./llcnmertz, Arbitrator '

DATED:

May 29, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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